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Abstract
In the quest for a panacea to ensure digital privacy, many users have switched to using decentralized open-source Exten-
sible Messaging and Presence Protocol multi-client instant messaging (IM) apps for secure end-to-end communication. 
In this paper, we present a forensic analysis of the artefacts generated on Android smartphones by Conversations and 
Xabber apps. We identified databases maintained by each app and external Secure Digital card directories that store 
local copies of user metadata. We analysed each app’s storage locations for forensic artefacts and how they can be used 
in a forensic investigation. The results in this paper show a detailed analysis of forensic files of interest which can be cor-
related to identify the local user’s multiple IM accounts and contact list, contents of messages exchanged with contacts, 
deleted files, time, and dates in the order of their occurrence. The contributions of this research include a comprehensive 
description of artefacts, which are of forensic interest, for each app analysed.
Keywords Mobile forensics · Android forensics · Jabber · Conversations · Xabber · Social networking · End-to-end 
encryption
1 Introduction
Most instant messaging (IM) apps provide a free social net-
working service to communicate with friends, family, and 
colleagues [1]. However, many users are concerned that 
their private messages could be read by the service provid-
ers that own these apps, as well as other third parties and 
even governments who like to gather their citizen’s private 
data. This has led to the wide adoption of secure IM apps 
that provide end-to-end encryption (E2EE), a method of 
encrypting data that only allows the sender and receiver 
of the message to decrypt and read messages passed 
between them [1]. Examples include Telegram, Signal, iMes-
sage, Viber, WhatsApp, Wire, Wickr, etc. Given their popu-
larity, these E2EE IM apps and services are being increas-
ingly used not only for legitimate activities but also for 
illicit ones [2, 3]. Therefore, forensic analysis of these apps 
continues to pose challenges to law enforcement involved 
with criminal investigations where such apps have been 
used as a means of secure communication in a crime.
Although privacy can be guaranteed using these E2EE 
IM apps, anonymity is still considered daunting for its 
users. These E2EE IM apps provide their users with a high 
degree of privacy, and the app providers cannot read the 
contents of the messages. However, the providers oper-
ate both centralized ecosystem services that enable them 
to still have access to information such as user identity, 
the identity of user contacts, and IP addresses. It is also 
difficult to create and discard accounts and often impos-
sible to run accounts simultaneously, or switch between 
them [4]. This issue of maintaining both privacy and ano-
nymity has led to the growing adoption of open-source 
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Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) client 
instant messaging apps. XMPP was originally developed 
in the Jabber open-source community to provide open, 
decentralized alternative instant messaging services and 
offers several key advantages over centralized or closed 
ecosystem services [5].
These key advantages include open-source code (so it 
is possible to audit its code), it provides message encryp-
tion, partner authentication, deniability, and perfect for-
ward secrecy through the use of the Off-The-Record (OTR), 
a cryptographic protocol that provides encryption for 
instant messaging conversations [6]. Another advantage 
is the use of Multi-End Message and Object Encryption 
(OMEMO), an open standard based on a Double Ratchet 
and Personal Eventing Protocol (PEP) for secure multi-
client end-to-end encryption [7]. Users can maintain ano-
nymity on OTR by using multiple accounts, connecting 
over a virtual private network (VPN)/The Onion Router 
(TOR), or connecting through private XMPP servers. There-
fore, with such characteristics of providing both E2EE and 
anonymity, interest in the forensic analysis of decentral-
ized open-source client instant messaging apps built using 
XMPP/Jabber and supports OTR or OMEMO is apparent.
In this paper, we deal with the forensic analysis of Con-
versations and Xabber apps. Two popular decentralized 
open-source XMPP/Jabber client instant messaging apps 
on Android smartphones with 100,000+ and 1,000,000+ 
downloads respectively from the Google Play Store at 
the time of writing this paper. Smartphones running the 
Android operating system held an 87% share of the global 
market in 2019 compared to the mobile operating system 
developed by Apple (iOS), which had a 13% share of the 
market [8]. Therefore, by focusing on the Android platform, 
we make the most of the potential investigative impact of 
our work. There has been no published research address-
ing forensic analysis on Conversations and Xabber apps on 
Android smartphones.
Our original contributions in this paper are the explo-
ration and analysis of Conversations and Xabber apps as 
summarised below:
• From our study and findings, we identified local cop-
ies of messages and files exchanged (forensic artefacts) 
between the user and other contacts that are stored in 
the main databases and of both apps and file system 
of the Android device.
• We demonstrate how these forensic artefacts can be 
correlated together and interpreted to infer various 
types of information which include the timeline of mes-
sages and files exchanged in the order of their occur-
rence and highlight any evidence of deletion.
• We reveal that the Conversations app which uses 
OMEMO for E2EE communication, store information 
associated with the local user, contacts and body of 
messages sent or received using the app as plaintext 
in the main database maintained by the app.
• We reveal that Xabber app which supports OTR for E2EE 
communication, stores information associated with 
the local user, contacts, and body of messages sent or 
received using the app as plaintext in the app’s main 
databases.
• We reveal how to map and interpret the data stored 
by both apps to the local user’s actions that generated 
them.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we dis-
cuss related works. In Sect.  3, we discuss the experi-
ment design, analysis methodology and tools used in our 
experiments. In Sect. 4, we discuss the investigative sce-
nario used in our experiments. Forensics analysis and find-
ings of Conversation and Xabber apps including artefacts 
recovered are presented in Sect. 5 and Sect. 6 respectively. 
Finally, in Sect. 7, we discuss our findings and in Sect. 8 we 
conclude the paper.
2  Related works
Most studies of smartphone forensics have focused on 
the extraction and analysis of data obtained from the 
device flash memory. Forensic analysis of social network-
ing applications has been conducted on Android devices 
as demonstrated in several studies [9–11]. Recently, there 
have been limited works that have focused on forensic 
analysis of open-source decentralized XMPP/Jabber cli-
ent IM apps on Android smartphones. The most notable 
one is Anglano et al. [3] forensic analysis of ChatSecure on 
Android platforms to recover forensic artefacts related 
to the chronology and contents of chat messages and 
decrypt the SQLCipher databases. Akinbi and Ojie [12] con-
ducted forensic analysis on Monal and Siskin IM decentral-
ized open-source XMPP apps on iOS devices. Before both 
studies, Wouter S. van Dongen [13] conducted a forensic 
analysis of Pidgin Messenger 2.0 on the Linux platform. The 
ChatSecure app on Android supports OTR for E2EE and 
has since been deprecated on the Android platform and 
is currently only available to iOS users [14]. Many studies 
have focused on popular centralized IM apps on Android 
smartphones and demonstrated in studies such as Wickr 
[15], WhatsApp [16], Telegram [17], and IMO [18]. However, 
forensic analysis of decentralized open-source XMPP/Jab-
ber E2EE multi-client IM apps on Android devices have 
been largely ignored, even as they are currently being 
used to send encrypted messages by many users. It is not 
clear why there are limited studies on forensic analysis of 
decentralized open-source XMPP/Jabber E2EE multi-client 
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IM apps. However, a recent breakthrough by law enforce-
ment agents in the arrest of organised criminals using 
EncroChat secure phones and cryptographic messaging 
systems which implements OTR [19], shows the forensic 
analysis of these messaging systems are necessary. To the 
best of our knowledge, no recent studies have focused on 
forensic analysis of Conversations and Xabber decentral-
ized open-source XMPP/Jabber E2EE multi-client IM apps 
on Android (with over 100,000 and 1,000,000 downloads 
on Google Play Store respectively) which are interoper-
able with other XMPP clients that support OMEMO or OTR 
encryption protocols.
3  Design of experiment, analysis 
methodology and tools
The design of the experiment required a set of controlled 
actions which were conducted separately for the Conver-
sations and Xabber apps. The analysis methodology is 
focused on the identification and recovery of forensic arte-
facts generated by both apps and stored on the Android 
device’s internal memory and external Secure Digital (SD) 
card. In each experiment, we installed and ran the current 
versions available on the Google Play Store (at the time of 
writing) which were Conversations v. 2.7.1+ pcr and Xab-
ber v. 2.6.6.645. We then proceeded to create IM accounts 
for a local user, several contacts’ IM accounts and carried 
out a set of actions to generate forensic artefacts. The 
order of actions performed in our experiments for both 
Conversations and Xabber apps to generate forensic arte-
facts and to create a realistic scenario for a typical user 
include the following:
1. Disable the use of E2EE encryption for communication.
2. Exchange regular chat messages and files between the 
user and all contacts.
3. Delete some messages and files sent and received by 
the local user.
4. Enable the use of E2EE encryption for communication.
5. Verify contacts’ encryption keys which ensure forward 
secrecy and secure message communication.
6. Exchange regular chat messages and files between the 
user and all contacts.
7. Delete some messages and files sent and received by 
the local user.
8. Block and delete one contact.
These set of actions in our experiments were played 
manually over a period to generate forensic traces [20, 
21], which can later be analysed based on our investi-
gative scenario (Sect. 4). These actions also ensure the 
experiments can be generalized, comprehensive and 
reproduced by a third party under the same operational 
conditions to achieve the same results [17]. In our analy-
sis, most of the files and artefacts generated are stored 
on the internal device memory which is normally inac-
cessible to users. To access the internal device memory 
and recover evidential data, we used Cellebrite UFED 4PC 
v. 7.32 to obtain a physical image and analysed the evi-
dential data using Cellebrite Physical Analyzer v. 7.31 [22]. 
Both tools are suitable commercial forensic tools used 
to maintain forensic soundness. At present, Cellebrite 
supports digital investigation on various third-party 
Android applications and can extract data from unrooted 
Android smartphones by exploiting certain bootloader 
vulnerabilities that exist in many devices running oper-
ating system versions up to Android 9 (Pie). To achieve 
results that are close to realistic scenarios, we used two 
unrooted Samsung Galaxy S8+ Android devices running 
Android 9 to conduct our experiments and analysis.
4  Investigative scenario
Conversations and Xabber are open-source XMPP multi-
client IM applications that allow their users to communi-
cate securely via their existing accounts on IM providers 
that use the XMPP protocol. To demonstrate the forensic 
analysis, interpretation of results in this paper, and how it 
can be applied in the context of a forensic investigation, 
we derived questions similar to the ones in the forensic 
analysis of ChatSecure by Anglano et al. [3] and created an 
investigative scenario which is described as follows:
Both the Conversations and Xabber apps are installed 
on an Android device which is being examined for eviden-
tial data and forensic files of interest. Forensic investiga-
tors are keen to extract digital evidence and answer the 
following questions:
 i. How many unique XMPP IM accounts associated 
with the local users were configured and used with 
the Conversations app and Xabber app?
 ii. What are the identities and XMPP IM accounts asso-
ciated with contacts of the local user for each app?
 iii. What is the timeline of communication with each of 
the contacts and what messages were exchanged?
 iv. Is there evidence of file exchanges between the local 
user and contacts? If yes, when did these exchanges 
occur and what is the content of such files?
 v. Can encrypted messages be recovered from the 
databases maintained by both apps?
 vi. Can deleted data be recovered from both apps?
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In the following sections, we present the forensic analy-
sis of the Conversations and Xabber apps respectively.
5  Forensic analysis of Conversations app
Conversations is a secure, decentralized, and open-source 
Jabber/XMPP multi-client IM app for Android 4.0+ smart-
phones that allow users to communicate securely and 
does not collect or store user information that could be 
inferred to identify the user [23]. On installation, Conver-
sations places the application paths in the main folder “/
data/data/eu.siacs.conversations/” and external storage 
card “/storage/emulated/0/Conversations” on the Android 
device as shown in Fig. 1. By default, the app requires 
the user to set up an existing account by specifying an 
XMPP address (username) and password or register a new 
account on the Conversation XMPP server and a random 
password is automatically generated and saved into the 
user account. Users can also add multiple accounts to an 
existing account and use them at the same time to com-
municate with other IM contacts. We created two XMPP 
IM accounts associated with the local user and three 
other contact XMPP IM accounts (Roster or Buddylist) to 
exchange messages with the local user. Details on these 
IM accounts are as follows (Table 1). 
The Conversations app uses OMEMO by default 
for encrypting conversations and the user can toggle 
between sending messages unencrypted or encrypted 
using OMEMO or OpenPGP. Other functionalities include 
contact and account management, notification, privacy, 
and expert settings (to tunnel all connections through 
Tor), contact management, and verification of counter-
part identity. The data such as chat records, configurations 
generated during the running of Conversations is stored 
in five subdirectories of the folder “eu.siacs.conversations”, 
they are “app_KeyStore” “cache”, “databases”, “files” and 
“shared_prefs” (see Fig. 1).
The shared_prefs and files subdirectories contain several 
activity files, default preferences settings files, media, and 
configuration files. For extensiveness, we mention a file 
in the shared_prefs subdirectory named eu.siacs.conversa-
tions_preferences.xml which stores the app’s settings and 
preferences. The most crucial evidential data of forensic 
interest are stored in an unencrypted SQLite database 
named “history” in the databases subdirectory under the 
directory path “/data/data/eu.siacs.conversations/data-
bases/history”. The path “/storage/emulated/0/Conversa-
tions” is used to store multimedia resources such as sent 
and received images, audio, and video files. This is the 
directory path for the external SD (memory) card which is 
accessible by attaching the Android device to a PC using 
a USB cable (see Table 2).
Fig. 1  Main folder structure of the Conversations app
Table 1  Conversations local user and contact IM accounts
Local user’s XMPP IM accounts analysed Android smartphone behemoth@conversations.im
myotherbehemothaccount@conversations.im
Contacts’ XMPP IM accounts on other Android devices Contact 1: bob_behemoth@conversations.im
Contact 2: behemoth01@conversations.im
Contact 3: alice_behemoth@conversations.im
Deleted and blocked contact’s XMPP IM account alice_behemoth@conversations.im




The unencrypted database containing chat messages and local user account information
/storage/emulated/0/Conversations/Media/ External SD card location where local copies of raw multimedia relating to audio and 
video messages are stored
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5.1  Location of Conversations app artefacts
The history database stores information generated by 
the Conversations app and associated user activities. 
These include user information, the list of the corre-
sponding contacts, and local copies of messages that 
have been exchanged in plaintext. This unencrypted 
database contains 18 different tables. From our find-
ings, only 10 out of these 18 tables contain information 
of forensic interest namely tables accounts, contacts, 
conversations, identities, messages, messages_index, mes-
sages_index_content, prekeys, signed_prekeys, and ses-
sions (See Fig. 2). We now discuss the contents of these 
tables along with their mapping to the user accounts 
and activities to answer questions from our investiga-
tive scenario.
5.2  Recovering account information
The accounts table contains information about the local 
user account or multiple IM accounts set up by the user 
including passwords for each one and stored in plaintext. 
However, according to the privacy policy of the app’s 
developers, user passwords are stored as hashes on Con-
versations’ XMPP servers [23]. Each IM account username 
(XMPP address) is assigned a unique user identifier (pri-
mary key) named “uuid” in the table. From our investiga-
tive scenario, we found both distinct accounts for a local 
user named behemoth@conversations.im and myotherbe-
hemothaccount@conversations.im stored in the table. Both 
accounts were active and used to exchange messages with 
contacts. The first part of each account is stored in the field 
“username” and domain part @conversations.im stored 
in the field named “server”, while the avatar field stores 
a unique file name associated with the user’s account 
image file stored in the subdirectory “/data/data/eu.siacs.
conversations/files/avatars/” and named 8f44441a2833f-
9542c14b2a258663a83420aed0b (see Fig. 3). Avatar images 
can help investigators reveal the identity of a local user or 
contacts if the avatar shows the face or feature that can be 
distinctly associated with the individual.
The contacts table stores information associated with 
active contacts the local user has added and exchanges 
messages or files with. Information about deleted or 
blocked contacts is not stored in this table. Each contact 
is associated with a local user IM account identified by the 
uuid from the accounts table and subsequently stored in 
the “accountUuid” field. The contacts XMPP address (user-
names) are stored in the “jid” field and the last time of 
message exchanged is stored in the “last_time” field. Other 
information about each contact such as avatar and chat 
group assigned, are stored in the “avatar” and “groups” 
fields respectively.
Information about the first conversation exchanged 
by the local user with all unique contacts is stored in 
the conversations table. This includes information about 
active, deleted, or blocked contacts. Each conversation Fig. 2  Structure of the main history database
Fig. 3  Fields of account table (fields containing irrelevant data are hidden)
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is assigned a unique identifier stored in the “uuid” field, 
the associated contact username is stored in the “name” 
field and the full contact XMPP address is stored in the 
“contactJid” field. The “created” field contains the Unix 
epoch time the first message was sent to or received 
from each contact. The identities tables store all only 
active XMPP addresses which include the multiple local 
user’s IM accounts and associated contacts identified by 
unique identifiers stored in the “account” field.
This table does not store information associated with 
deleted or blocked contacts. Each unique identifier in 
the “account” field is a foreign key in the conversations 
table stored in the “accountUuid” field. This key shows 
the relationship between a contact that was added by 
a specific local user IM account. The IM accounts asso-
ciated with the local user are assigned the integer 1 
and 0 for contacts in the “ownkey” field. Information 
on verified and trusted IM accounts are stored in the 
“trust” field. Figure 4 shows the foreign key relationship 
between the conversations and identities tables and 
highlighting the deleted contact IM account informa-
tion stored in the conversations table. The conversations 
table stores information associated with the creation 
or start of a message with a contact (whether active 
or deleted) by a local user using a specific IM account.
5.3  Recovering chronology of chat logs, message 
contents, and deleted files
Each time a message is sent or received, the Conversations 
app stores details of both the textual content and associ-
ated metadata in the messages, messages_index, and mes-
sages_index_content tables. The messages_index and mes-
sages_index_content tables are similar as they both contain 
the body of each message stored in fields named “body” 
and “c1body” respectively and each associated with unique 
identifiers. However, the messages table is the main table 
in the database. It contains a detailed record of all textual 
messages sent and received, the chronological time of 
when each message was sent or received, and whether 
each message was sent encrypted or unencrypted. The 
messages table can be joined to the conversations table 
by the field named “conversationUuid”. Also, the conver-
sations table can be joined to the accounts table by the 
field named “accountUuid”. These joins and relationships 
between all three tables can help to identify the correla-
tion of messages exchanged using a specific local user’s 
Fig. 4  Conversations table and identities tables
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IM account with a contact. Moreover, it can be used to 
identify when the first message was created and sent to a 
contact using a specific user IM account. Figure 5 illustrates 
the relationships and joins between the accounts, conver-
sations, and messages tables which can help reconstruct 
distinct Conversations accounts with messages.
In the figure, we see two distinct Conversations 
accounts, named behemoth and myotherbehemothac-
count (see the records stored in accounts in Fig. 5). Both 
these accounts have a unique identifier “uuid” which is a 
foreign key in the conversations table. The “uuid” field (pri-
mary key) in the conversations table appears as a foreign 
key in the messages table in the field “conversationUuid”. 
Hence we see from the 2nd record in the conversations 
table (uuid = d52cc163…), the behemoth@conversations.
im user account (accountUuid = 6e0ddfb…) started a 
conversation (created first message) with the contact 
behemoth01 (contactJid = behemoth01@conversations.
im) on the 17th of Apr, 2020 at 18:37:28 pm UTC + 1 (cre-
ated = ‘1587148648509′). In the 2nd record from the mes-
sages table (uuid= e0e069e4… and conversationUuid= 
d52cc163…), we see details of a message (body= ‘Hello’) 
sent on the 17th of Apr, 2020 at 18:37:48 pm UTC+1 
(timeSent= ‘1587148668330’).
Other information stored in the messages table includes 
local user and contacts IM accounts that sent or received 
messages, the relative path of multimedia files exchanged, 
message status indicating read, edited, or deleted and 
unique identifiers for each messages which are stored in 
the “uuid” field. Since all the records of messages and files 
exchanged are stored in the messages table, we can eas-
ily reconstruct the sequence of events, contents of chat 
messages, and show evidence of deleted files. In Fig. 6, 
we see information associated with only active contact IM 
accounts (behemoth01@conversations.im and bob_behe-
moth@conversations.im) stored in the “counterpart” field. 
The “timeSent” and “body” fields store the time the com-
munication occurred and the textual content of the mes-
sage respectively. Record of messages and files exchanged 
with the deleted and blocked contact (alice_behemoth@
conversations.im) are not stored in the table.
To demonstrate the chronology and sequence of 
exchanged messages and files from our investigative sce-
nario, a total of 17 messages exchanged is shown in Fig. 6. 
From this figure, we see that the first record in the field 
named “body” corresponds to an unencrypted (encryp-
tion = 0) incoming message (status = 0) from the conver-
sations.im server on the 17th Apr. 2020 at 18:36:54 pm 
UTC + 1 (Unix time stamp = ‘1587148614239′). The “type” 
Fig. 5  Reconstruction of user accounts and messages
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field (type = 0), indicates the message is text. The 12th 
record in the body field corresponds to an encrypted 
(encryption = 5) outgoing message (status = 2) sent on 
the 18th Apr. 2020 at 21:03:59  pm UTC + 1 (Unix time 
stamp = ‘1587243839908′) to the contact behemoth01@
conversations.im. The “type” field contains the integer 
2 indicating the message exchanged is a video file. In 
Table 3, we presented a detailed interpretation of the rel-
evant fields.
There is no option to delete chat messages from the 
Conversations app chat window at the time of this writ-
ing. However, files exchanged can be deleted, and chat 
messages can be edited, cleared, or closed. In the scenario, 
we edited one message and deleted an image from the 
Fig. 6  Messages table
Table 3  Structure of the messages table
Name Role Type Meaning
uuid Primary key Text Unique identifier of the message
conversationUuid Foreign key Text Unique identifier of the conversation
timeSent – Int The date this message has been sent or received (13-digits Unix epoch format)
Counterpart – Text IM contact message was sent to or received from
Body – Text Body of the message
Encryption – Int Flag indicating whether a message is encrypted (5) or unencrypted (0)
Status – Int Flag indicating whether a message was sent (2 or 8) or received (0)
Type – Int Flag indicating whether the body of a message is text (0), image file (1) or video file (2)
relativeFilePath – Text The relative path of an image or video file sent or received using the AES Galois/Coun-
ter Mode of operation
Edited – Text Unique identifier for an edited message
Read – Boolean Flag indicating whether a message is read (1) or unread (0)
Deleted – Boolean Flag indicating whether the body of a message is deleted (1) or kept (0)
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chat window. The 7th and 14th records correspond to 
information about this action in the “edited” and “deleted” 
(deleted = 1) fields as shown in Fig. 7. Once the deletion 
occurred, the image was removed from the app’s chat win-
dow, but a local copy persists on the external SD card in 
the directory /storage/emulated/0/Conversations/Media/
Conversations Images/. A copy of our deleted image on the 
local user’s phone was recovered in the directory path /
storage/emulated/0/Conversations/Media/Conversations 
Images/c0397114-23e6-4998-9473-3b9e8cea429b.jpg.
The prekeys, signed_prekeys, and sessions tables contain 
information of multiple prekeys and verified keys used 
by the local user’s multiple IM accounts in the forward 
secrecy and secure message communication with contacts 
as explained in OMEMO cryptographic analysis [24]. Our 
experiment and analysis of Conversations were limited to 
the use of OMEMO for encrypted communication because 
it is considered to have better encryption features than 
OpenPGP [7].
6  Forensic analysis of Xabber app
Xabber for Android is a secure, decentralized, and open-
source Jabber/XMPP multi-client IM app [25]. On instal-
lation, Xabber places the application’s path in the main 
folder “/data/data/com.xabber.android” on the Android 
device as shown in Fig. 8. By default, the app requires the 
user to set up an existing account by specifying an XMPP 
address and password or register a new account on the 
xabber.org server. Users can also add multiple accounts 
to an existing account and use them simultaneously to 
Fig. 7  Messages table showing record of edited and deleted messages
Fig. 8  The folder structure of the Xabber app
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communicate with other IM contacts. In our investiga-
tive scenario, we created two XMPP IM accounts associ-
ated with the local user and two other contact XMPP IM 
accounts to exchange messages with the local user. One 
of the contact IM accounts was deleted after a few chat 
messages were exchanged. Details on these IM accounts 
are as follows (see Table 4).
The Xabber app supports OTR encryption by default 
for E2EE message encryption and the user can toggle 
between sending messages unencrypted or encrypted 
by switching the OTR plugin mode in the app’s security 
settings. Other setting options include contact, chat and 
account management, notification, privacy, connection, 
and debug settings. Forensic artefacts and associated 
metadata generated by Xabber are stored in 8 subdirecto-
ries of the folder “com.xabber.android”, they are “app_Key-
Store”, “app_textures”, “app_web_webview”, “cache”, “data-
bases”, “files”, “no_backup” and “shared_prefs” (see Fig. 8).
Like the Conversations app, the Xabber app subdirec-
tories contain several activity files, default preferences set-
tings files, media, and configuration files. The most crucial 
evidential data of forensic interest are stored in two unen-
crypted Realm open source object database management 
system files [26] (“xabber.realm” and “realm_database.
realm”) and one unencrypted SQLite database (“xabber.
db”). The path “/data/data/com.xabber.android/cache/
image_manager_disk_cache/” is used to store multime-
dia resources such as avatars, sent and received images, 
audio, and video files. Details for each storage location is 
described in Table 5.
6.1  Location of Xabber app artefacts
From our findings, the xabber.realm database is the main 
database where the Xabber app stores and maintains the 
information concerning the accounts used on the app and 
associated activities. The database stores local copies of 
the messages in plaintext that have been exchanged and 
contains 8 different tables. From our findings, only 4 out 
of these 8 tables contain information of forensic interest 
namely class_Attachment, class_ContactRealm, class_Mes-
sageItem, and pk. The realm_database.realm database 
stores account information concerning the local user and 
contact IM accounts. The database consists of 21 tables. 
From our findings, only 7 out of these 21 tables contain 
information of forensic interest namely class_Account-
Realm, class_ChatDataRealm, class_UploadServer, class_
XabberAccountRealm, class_XMPPUserRealm,class_SyncSta-
teRealm, and pk. Lastly, xabber.db database has 30 tables. 
However, only 4 out of these 30 tables contain information 
of forensic interest namely avatars, groups, groups_group, 
otr, and otr_list.
We now discuss the contents of these databases, their 
tables, and fields along with their mapping to the user 
accounts and activities to answer questions from our 
investigative scenario.
6.2  Recovering account information
The realm_database.realm database stores information 
of distinct XMPP IM accounts and passwords configured 
by the local user on Xabber. The record is stored in the 
class_AccountRealm table in plaintext. Each IM account 
is assigned a unique identifier (primary key) and stored 
in the “id” field. The account names, associated XMPP 
Table 4  Xabber local user and 




Contacts’ XMPP IM accounts on other Android devices Contact 1: behemothlabs01@xabber.org
Contact 2: alice.behemoth@xabber.org
Deleted contact XMPP IM account alice.behemoth@xabber.org
Table 5  File paths of critical evidence sources of the Xabber app
Directory path Details
/data/data/com.xabber.android/files/xabber.realm Unencrypted database containing local user account information and 
exchanged chat messages
/data/data/com.xabber.android/files/realm_database.realm Unencrypted database containing local user account information




Location where local copies of raw multimedia audio and video files 
are stored
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server names, passwords, and authentication tokens are 
stored in the username, serverName password, and token 
fields respectively. The avatars table in the xabber.db 
database, stores information of all IM accounts in the 
“user” field, and the hash value of the local user’s avatar 
in the “hash” field. The local user’s raw avatar (image 
file) is stored in the directory “/data/data/com.xabber.
android/files/avatars/<hash value>”. In the xabber.db 
database, the groups, and groups_group tables jointly 
store group information on local user IM accounts while 
the otr and otr_list tables jointly store information about 
contacts XMPP IM accounts that have been verified.
Information associated with the contacts of the local 
user is stored in the class_ChatDataRealm table of the 
realm_database.realm database. The table contains one 
record of multiple local user IM accounts with the cor-
responding contact IM account with whom messages 
have been exchanged. The table also includes records 
of deleted contacts. From our investigative scenario, we 
recovered information regarding previous exchanges 
between one of the local user’s IM account (otherbehe-
moth@xabber.org) and the deleted contact’s IM account 
(alice.behemoth@xabber.org). However, the body of the 
messages is not stored in this table.
6.3  Recovering chronology of chat logs, message 
contents, and deleted files
The xabber.realm database stores record of textual content 
of both encrypted and unencrypted messages and meta-
data (e.g., the unique identifier for each message, a status 
flag which indicates whether a message is sent or received, 
corresponding contact IM account information, date 
and time when the exchange occurred). These records 
are stored in the class_MessageItem table. In Table 6, we 
present a detailed interpretation of the relevant fields. 
Table 6  Structure of the class_MessageItem table
Name Role Type Meaning
uniqueId Primary key String Unique identifier of the message
Account – String Local user IM account
User – String Contact user IM account message is exchanged with
Text – String Body of the message
Incoming – Boolean Flag indicating whether a message was received (true) or sent (false)
Encrypted – Boolean Flag indicating whether a message is encrypted (true) or unencrypted (0)
Offline – Boolean Flag indicating whether the contact IM account was online (true) or offline 
(false)
Timestamp – Int The date this message has been sent or received (13-digits Unix epoch format)
Error – Boolean Flag indicating message error (true or false)
Delivered – Boolean Flag indicating message delivery (true or false)
Read – Boolean Flag indicating whether a message is read (true) or unread (false)
Fig. 9  class_MessagesItem table
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To demonstrate the chronology of messages exchanged 
with each one of the contacts from our investigative sce-
nario, we present some of the contents of 13 messages 
exchanged and stored in this table as shown in Fig. 9.
We see from the figure; both unencrypted 
(encr ypted = False)  and encr ypted messages 
(encrypted = True) exchanged between the local user’s 
IM account (behemothlabs@xabber.org) and the contact 
(behemothlabs01@xabber.org) are stored in plaintext in 
the field named “text”. Information associated with the 
local user’s actions are stored in the “action” field when 
OTR encryption is enabled (action = otr_encryption) and 
successful verification of the contact’s encryption key is 
complete (action = otr_smp_verified). All subsequent 
messages exchanged between the user and contact are 
encrypted (encrypted = True) until OTR encryption is disa-
bled (action = otr_unreadable).
Messages exchanged with deleted contacts are also 
stored in the class_MessageItem table. In Fig. 9, we see 
from the last record in the table, an unencrypted mes-
sage sent (encrypted = False and incoming = False) from 
the local user’s IM account (otherbehemoth@xabber.org) 
to the deleted contact (alice.behemoth@xabber.org) on 
the 19th Apr. 2020 at 20:37:20  pm UTC + 1 (Unix time 
stamp = ‘1587328640815′) is stored in the field “text” 
(text = ‘Hello there’).
The class_Attachment table in the xabber.realm data-
base, stores record file attachments sent or received by 
the local user accounts (see Fig. 10). Each file is assigned 
a unique identifier and stored in the “uniqueId” field. The 
“fileUrl” field contains the direct link to file attachment con-
tent on XMPP servers. By entering the URL link stored in 
the field into a web browser, for example (https ://uploa 
d02.xabbe r.org/4f9ed c.../QG.../title ), the file uploaded by 
the Xabber client can be accessed directly.
Deleted media files such as images can also be recov-
ered from the /data/data/com.xabber.android/cache/
image_manager_disk_cache/ directory path within the 
Xabber app’s Android filesystem folder. In the directory, 
each media file is stored as a unique file name (hash) 
with the “0.0” extension. In our investigative scenario, we 
deleted an image that was received by the local user in the 
app chat window. However, a raw copy of the same image 
was recovered from this directory.
7  Discussion
Lack of privacy and anonymity on encrypted instant mes-
saging platforms are huge concerns for privacy advocates 
and many users. At this moment, apps like WhatsApp have 
been criticised for their new privacy policy which allows 
the vendor to collect user data and account information 
for marketing purposes. Rival platforms such as Signal 
and Telegram apps require users to provide a valid phone 
number that is tied to their account during registration. 
These concerns have made many users switch to open-
source XMPP multi-client instant messaging apps which 
provide E2EE and anonymity for communication. We 
believe these reasons make our work even more relevant 
as many users utilize these applications for private legiti-
mate communication but also illicit ones. Therefore, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the primary forensic analysis 
of Conversations and Xabber, two popular XMPP multi-
client apps that support two distinct protocols, OMEMO 
and OTR respectively for E2EE communication. The goal of 
this research was to analyse databases maintained by both 
apps and the internal device storage locations on Android 
devices for digital forensic artefacts and metadata. The 
study also aimed to show the importance of correlation 
and interpretation of the artefacts generated by each app 
and present findings that would be beneficial for forensic 
investigators.
Our findings show both Conversations and Xabber apps 
store local copies of user data in unencrypted databases, 
internal and external device storage locations, that can be 
extracted from an Android mobile device during mobile 
forensic analysis. These include user account information, 
user contact information, chat messages, files exchanged 
and evidence of deleted messages or contacts. These find-
ings are similar to the results shown in the forensic analysis 
of Telegram [17] and IMO [18] apps on Android devices. 
However, there are major differences due to the features 
and E2EE protocols used. Both Conversations and Xabber 
apps support the use of multiple XMPP IM accounts by a 
Fig. 10  class_Attachment table
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local user to send messages, support the exchange of mes-
sages with other decentralized XMPP clients irrespective of 
the E2EE protocol implemented and allow a user to enable 
or disable encryption for communication.
These features are indicative of how forensic artefacts 
that persist in the apps’ databases are stored compared to 
Telegram and IMO, which are centralized IM apps, imple-
ment alternative protocols for E2EE and are not interop-
erable with other messaging apps. Results presented in 
the forensic analysis of ChatSecure on Android devices 
[3], which uses OTR for E2EE communication, show local 
copies of both exchanged messages and files can be 
recovered from two distinct databases maintained by the 
app. The findings are consistent with results shown from 
our analysis of the Xabber app which also supports OTR. 
Although ChatSecure uses encrypted SQLite databases, 
Xabber uses a combination of unencrypted Realm open-
source object databases and an SQLite database to store 
user data locally. It is also worth noting that all data and 
forensic artefacts associated with both Conversations and 
Xabber apps are deleted from the mobile device and can-
not be recovered once the apps are uninstalled.
Therefore, the discussion of our findings and inter-
pretation of artefacts from this study can be valuable for 
forensic investigators that come across these apps during 
mobile forensic investigations.
8  Conclusion
In this paper, we identify all the artefacts left by Conversa-
tions and Xabber apps. In our analysis of the Conversa-
tions app which uses OMEMO for E2EE, we access the main 
database maintained by the app, analyse, and recover all 
critical user’s information stored in plaintext. These include 
information associated with the local user’s multiple IM 
accounts, information associated with contact IM accounts 
(active and deleted), the textual content of messages 
(encrypted and unencrypted) exchanged, files including 
deleted ones, and chronology in the order of their occur-
rence. Although we showed information associated with a 
deleted contact’s IM account, information associated with 
messages exchanged with such contact is not stored in the 
app’s main database.
In our analysis of the Xabber app which uses OTR for 
E2EE, we were able to access the three databases main-
tained by the app. We identified, analysed, and showed 
information associated with the local user’s multiple 
IM accounts, information associated with all contact IM 
accounts (active and deleted), deleted files and textual 
content of all encrypted and unencrypted messages 
exchanged.
It is worth noting that the recovery of critical informa-
tion as demonstrated in this study cannot be generalized 
to other E2EE decentralized open-source XMPP/Jabber 
multi-client instant messaging apps. However, for foren-
sic investigators, this study can aid forensic investigations 
for both Conversations and Xabber apps and our meth-
odology can be adopted in the forensic analysis of simi-
lar XMPP/Jabber apps. Future directions include analyses 
of XMPP private servers for traces of evidential forensic 
artefacts.
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